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Institutionalized Powerlessness in Context: The Static and Dynamic Nature of Women’s
Status in Rural Bangladesh
Akiko Nosaka and Bradford W. Andrews1
Abstract
Understanding the institutional structures surrounding the social status of women is an
important topic in studies of gender and inter-generational relationships. This article uses
exchange theory to examine the status and familial interactions of women in rural Bangladesh
throughout their lives. Overall, their status today remains low but it does fluctuate according to a
highly institutionalized pattern of family-based social expectations. Furthermore, this article
shows that although the institutions defining a woman’s status appear to be stable, they are also
changing because of the society’s exposure to recent worldwide advances in family planning and
health care.
Key Words: Women, Power, Rural Bangladesh
Introduction
Analyzing the institutional structure of family relationships provides a sturdy platform
from which one can examine and understand the maintenance of low status characterizing the
lives of women in rural Bangladesh. Social institutions rigorously define the narrow latitudes
within which cultural actors must navigate and they are often described as static partially because
of the temporally limited perspective of synchronic ethnographic fieldwork. We must not,
however, lose track of the fact that culture is dynamic and that despite institutional rigors cultural
change is inevitable. The principal focus of this article uses the perspective of exchange theory
(see Blau 1964; Emerson 1962) to highlight the strength of the traditional family institutions
undermining the status of women in rural Bangladesh. It also addresses how recent developments
including emergent fertility control and increased longevity appear to be transforming the
variation in the status of women over the life-course. Although the strength of the traditional
structures seems firmly intact, the new changes reflecting the incursions of the modern world
may have long-term significance.2
Similar to the life experiences of women in many traditional societies (see Brown 1982;
Brown and Kerns 1985; Dickerson-Putman and Brown 1994), the status of rural Bangladeshi
women typically begins to increase after they have been married for several years. Compared to
many young wives, middle age women are able to enjoy relatively powerful family interactions
and positions. The duration of middle age is relatively short, however, and most women find it
progressively difficult to maintain a secure position in the family as they become older. This
condition is the result of a highly constraining and stable set of social institutions in addition to
the inevitable decline of one’s health that comes with old age.
According to exchange theorists (i.e. Dowd 1975; Mulkay 1971), institutionalization is
the repetitive performance of a behavior, or set of behaviors that eventually not only take on a
normative status, but also embody something that is culturally perceived as valuable. The
institutions validate and discourage, therefore, any deviation from the expected types of
interpersonal relationships in a culture. The authors indicate that while there are exceptions, the
majority of Bangladeshi women follow a predictable pattern of prescribed familial interaction
that changes behaviorally as they become older. Overall their status remains low and is
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especially pronounced when they are young wives or reach old age. Their lives demonstrate,
therefore, how institutionalization is particularly effective at keeping powerless individuals from
enhancing their status because they must submit to the normative expectations defining their
roles in society.
The authors also emphasize that institutions are not static. Some young wives have
recently gained more autonomy over their reproductive behavior because of a new social
emphasis on fertility control. Although this emerging source of autonomy may affect a young
woman’s status, it is unclear whether it has significantly influenced other dimensions of their
familial roles that continue to be constrained by traditional institutions. For older women, the
increase in Bangladeshi longevity has now extended the length of time many of them must suffer
the negative social, physical, and psychological consequences of the aging process. These
consequences are linked to their failure to accumulate social resources during earlier years and
their progressively deteriorating health. This represents a new source of stress that has further
exacerbated the institutionalized quality of misery associated with a woman’s status in old age.
Although the focus on social dynamics in the present study is on reproductive behavior
and prolonged longevity, the recent prevalence of micro-finance programs are also changing the
social status of poor Bangladeshi women. Since the 1980s, an increasing number of rural
women have become involved in such programs, which are designed to alleviate poverty. These
programs are run by both government agencies and nongovernmental organizations like the
Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (see Korten 1989; Ray 1987;
Yunus 2003). The authors acknowledge this phenomenon as a significant source of social
change, especially with regard to the economically based power struggle between men and
women, but it is not treated explicitly in the following discussion.3 Considerable research on this
important topic can be found elsewhere (i.e. Ackerly 1995; Goetz and Gupta 1996; Hashemi et
al. 1996; Rahman 1999; Schuler et al. 1997; Todd 1996; World Bank 1999).
The following discussion is based on qualitative first-hand information collected by the
primary author in Bangladesh during 1995 and 1996. It is divided into seven sections. The first
section provides an outline of exchange theory and why it represents a useful framework for
analyzing the institutionalized status of women in rural Bangladesh. The next section briefly
describes some current statistics on Bangladesh and how the data for this study was retrieved.
The third section sketches the normative institutions framing the behavior of rural Bangladeshi
women. The remaining four sections discuss the culturally prescribed qualities characteristic of
their lives when they are newly married, making the transition to middle age, during middle age,
and finally during old age, respectively.
Exchange Theory
Exchange theory is predicated on the simple notion that an individual's interactions are
based on attempts to maximize rewards and minimize costs --both material and non-material
(Dowd 1975, 1980; Knipe 1971). Individuals are motivated to invest in interactions that garner
more rewards than costs. Interactions will be terminated when costs become excessive, or when
a new alternative exchange partner with less costly demands becomes available (Bengston et al.
1997; Dowd 1975; Emerson 1962). Many interactions are often unbalanced exchange
relationships in which one participant is more dependent on (or desirous of) the rewards provided
by the other who holds a greater share of valued resources. In such cases, the individual with
more resources can impose a rate of exchange most favorable to him/her by threatening to curtail
the interaction (Nelson 2000). The individual with fewer resources can opt out of such an
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unfavorable relationship (Berger 1994; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). It is often the case, however,
that the subordinate participant will opt to stay in the relationship because he/she is dependent on
the rewards the dominant participant can provide. Therefore, the subordinate individual usually
accepts the imposed exchange rate and will reduce his/her own demands to achieve an acceptable
balance between the rewards and costs (Nelson 2000). In other words, the weaker individual
may still perceive an acceptable level of reward, but the gains relative to the costs are less than
they would be in a balanced relationship.
In such interactions, the one who imposes the rate of exchange has a certain measure of
power over the other. Power is defined as "the state of relative independence that results from
having a greater share of valued resources than one's exchange partner" (Dowd 1983:29).
Power, therefore, derives from valued resources (or power resources). While such resources may
be wealth, knowledge, skills, and social position, they may also be approval, respect, and
compliance (Blau 1964; Dowd 1975). What is considered a valuable resource, and who has
access to certain resources are largely determined by culture (Akiyama et al. 1997). It is often
the case that an individual with limited resources will comply submissively to acquire rewards
even though he/she may not consider the situation to be highly desirable (Mulkay 1971).
Exchange theorists emphasize that compliance is often institutionalized. For example,
when an old worker’s productivity begins to decline, his supervisor may offer him a less
prestigious position. He accepts the offer because he is dependent on the income although the
amount he will gain in the new position will be less. As his performance further declines, he will
eventually be asked to resign and receive retirement compensation. He must accept the offer
because he has no power resources other than compliance with which to exchange for his
income. In Western societies, such a scenario has been repeated so many times that it “has
become routinized, institutionalized, and legitimated” (Dowd 1975:590).
When exchanges are institutionalized, the individual with little power is likely to be more
pressured to accept undesirable offers from exchange partners with more power.
Institutionalization can mean the establishment of social norms, which prescribe proper behavior.
For example, if an older worker refuses to retire despite such a norm, then his relatives, peers,
and neighbors may sanction him (Mulkay 1971). In many cases, institutionalization also
generates cultural values that embody goals or desirable ways of life. When retirement is
considered a desirable goal at the end of one’s working years, an old worker will expect social
approval and acknowledgment from those around him when he retires (Dowd 1975; Mulkay
1971). This approval is a type of reward as is the retirement money that he will receive in
exchange for his compliance. Therefore, if he follows the institutionalized framework defining
retirement, then he will receive socially approved status and economic security although the
value of those rewards may not be exceptionally high. Compliance is a costly behavior because
it is the acceptance of a one-way offer from an exchange partner. Despite the costs, however, a
powerless individual must often comply with such one-way offers particularly when powerbased relationships are institutionalized. As the following discussion demonstrates, the relatively
low status of rural Bangladeshi women predominantly relates to the fact that compliance is the
principal resource they must use in social exchanges throughout most of their lives.
Study Background
Before describing the institutional nature of women’s status in rural Bangladesh, it is
necessary to review some basic characteristics abut the society and the methods used to collect
data for this study. Bangladesh is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world.
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In 1998, the country’s GNP per capita was as low as $350, and the literacy rate of adults (age 15
and above) was 40.1 percent (Human Development Report 2000). Between 1981 and 1993, 26
percent of Bangladeshi people did not have access to health services, and sanitation systems
were not available to at least 57 percent of the population prior to 1998 (Human Development
Report 2000). While urbanization is ongoing, 80 percent of the people reside in rural areas
where traditional socio-economic characteristics remain relatively unchanged (Cleland et al.
1994:78). In a typical rural village, the economy is predominantly based on subsistence
agriculture although fishing is also prevalent. The vast majority of villagers are not wealthy, and
many of them are unemployed or have only temporary jobs. Overall, the level of education is
low but has recently been on the increase. The dominant religion Muslim but about 22% of the
population is Hindu. The lives of the women discussed here play out within this general rural
social context.
Interviews and observations were used to collect the following data from an area referred
to as Matlab, located about 45 kilometers southeast of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. This
area is relatively isolated and inaccessible because of an immense river system, and it exhibits
characteristics typical of rural Bangladesh. Data collection was originally designed to examine
mothers-in-law's influence on the reproductive behavior of their young daughters-in-law.
Fieldwork consisted of questionnaire-interviews conducted at rural residences with a total of 447
pairs of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. This initial phase emphasized the retrieval of
information on their socio-demographic status, reproductive behavior, and fertility views (see
Nosaka 1997, 2000). Afterwards, 20 households were selected for return visits to acquire
qualitative information on women’s family interactions and to conduct more extended
observations of their daily activities. These households were selected with the intention of
collecting information from women with varying socio-demographic characteristics with respect
to age, marital status (widow or not), number of children, and level of education. Interviews
were conducted with mothers-in-law, daughters-in-law, and other family members, including
males.
Because of the original objectives of the fieldwork, all middle and old age women in the
sample were mothers-in-law. Therefore, this article does not address the lives of childless
middle and old age women whose experiences would probably differ considerably from those of
women with grown sons (Cain 1986). Also, the target population was further restricted to
daughters-in-law who were equal to or younger than 30 years old. Finally, all personal names
used are pseudonyms.
Rural Life and Women
Traditional norms and values largely regulate a rural woman’s life. One traditional norm
that continues to influence a woman’s life is the strict division of labor based on gender. While a
man typically generates income for the family outside the household, a woman is expected to
take care of meal preparation, house cleaning, childcare and most other domestic activities that
take place in the extended family compound referred to as the bari. Since these tasks do not
directly generate income, a woman must depend on a man, whether it be her father, husband, or
son, throughout her entire life for economic support (Cain 1982). Another traditional norm
influencing a woman’s life is the institution of purdah, a social custom that limits the visibility
and mobility of a woman outside the home. When males or strangers are present in the domestic
setting, a woman is also expected to cover herself as an expression of diffidence and self-respect
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(Aziz 1985:64). Purdah also ensures a strict observance of modest and submissive behavior
(Kabeer 1988:101).
A woman’s status as a wife or mother represents her only real option for social promotion
especially since she is excluded from the public sphere (Dixon 1978). It is important that the
family functions well because it is the principal unit with which an individual identifies and
receives support (Davis and Blake 1956:215; Mannan 1989:71). After marriage, a woman
usually goes to live in her husband’s household. Here, she is evaluated based on how properly
she devotes herself to its function and the well being of its members. She is also expected to
have children, particularly sons because they are essential for maintaining the integrity of a
household. It is evident that the fertility behavior of young women is largely influenced by a
strong cultural preference for sons (Bairagi and Chowdhury 1994; Nosaka 2000). Compared to
daughters, sons represent dependable economic assets and sources of future security because
they will generate income for the household economy and remain with their parents to support
them. Through sons, therefore, a woman not only gains social recognition, but she also
establishes a secure position in the household (Foner 1984:77).
The culturally respected status of household management and child rearing represent an
important basis of security for a rural woman. Her resources seldom include wealth and material
possessions because her household is usually poor and contains few if any economic assets she
controls outright. As a result, although compliance is the principal power resource she has
throughout her life, knowledge and experience are typically her most valuable and effective
ones. Successful household management permits her to develop these resources thereby
increasing her status as “experienced wife” and “successful mother.” Thus provisioned, she
gains familial respect and enhances her influence and ability to acquire the consent of those
around her.
While a rural woman’s familial demeanor evolves as she becomes older because her
power resources change, it is also largely institutionalized in that she is expected to accept the
norms and values defining her behavior at each stage of life. It is usually too risky for a woman
to step outside institutionalized norms although cases of deviation to occur. Individuals most
constrained by normative expectations include a young wife or an old, frail woman because
compliance is usually the only resource they have. If such a woman does not follow the
behaviors expected of her, then she risks negative sanctions by other family members and
neighbors, and may even lose her means of familial security. Thus, she is most likely to adhere
to socially valued behaviors in order that her status be met with approval and her position in the
family remain fixed.
The Young Wife
A rural woman typically marries while she is in her teens (Aziz 1985:58; Ellickson
1988:62; Rahman 1993:6; Shaikh 1982:26). When a young wife first moves in she is expected
to perform all of the house chores but she rarely knows how to do them exactly the way they
must be done in her new household. She also has no experience raising her own children. In
contrast, her mother-in-law has considerable opinionated knowledge and experience in both of
these areas. Consequently, the relationship between a young wife and her mother-in-law is
typically unbalanced. A young daughter-in-law is expected to submissively follow the lead of
her mother-in-law who is socially recognized as the one in charge of instructing and supervising
the younger female family members. For example, it was common to see a mother-in-law
directing a young woman in the proper way to sweep or spread beans or chilies on a mat to dry.
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Regima, who had been married for three years, admitted that her 50 year-old mother-in-law still
supervised her principal daily activities. Each day, her mother-in-law would clean the yard, care
for the goats and cows, and look after her grandchildren, but she seldom took part in cooking.
Meal preparation is one of the most time consuming domestic tasks especially if the family is
large. Regima usually prepared all of the household meals according to the specific wishes of
her mother-in-law.
Purdah further promotes an unbalanced relationship between a young daughter-in-law
and her husband’s family members. While all women are expected to observe purdah, strict
adherence to it is mandatory for a young wife. Not only her visibility and mobility should be
kept minimal, but she should also be obedient to her husband and parents-in-law, and refrain
from expressing her desires or making requests (Aziz 1985:62-68). Consequently, a young wife
is rarely involved in household decision-making (Chowdhury 1995:38), being left instead to
comply with the decisions of others. Most young women said that they seldom expressed what
they believed the household needed. They even had little influence over the meal plans even
though they were expected to do most of the cooking. Since proper women are not supposed to
go out in public, the father-in-law, husband, or grown sons usually shop for the food in the
market. Most daughters-in-law said that they seldom made requests to the men for particular
food items because such forward behavior was considered indecorous.
The compliance of a young wife is highly institutionalized. All young daughters-in-law
admitted that they would not leave the bari unless their husbands, mothers-in-law, and/or
fathers-in-law gave them permission. One daughter-in-law who had been married for two and a
half years said that she did not even request permission to leave the bari; she only left when her
parents-in-law made arrangements for her to do so. She said, “It is not right for me to make such
a request. It does not bother me to wait until my parents-in-law decide that I can leave the bari.
They know when the time is right”
Sometimes a young woman will chose to deviate from the behavior society expects of her
even though compliance is the norm. For example, one man said that his sister and her young
daughter left her husband shortly after he acquired a second wife. Although the vast majority of
Bangladeshi men today are monogamous, Islamic laws do permit a man to have multiple wives.
In this case, however, this woman could not tolerate living with her husband’s second wife
despite the cultural expectation that she submit to the new household arrangement. She was
working in a garment factory at the time and relied on her brother and his wife to care for her
daughter. In another case, one woman returned to her natal family a few months after her
marriage because she and her in-laws could not get along. Her angrily exasperated mother-inlaw said, “She just left. It has been 3 months. I do not know whether she will be back.” In this
case, given the behavior expected of the daughter-in-law, her departure appears to have been a
clear insult to the mother-in-law. These examples not only represent young wives rebelling
against cultural expectations, but they also reflect the challenge they face trying to reach a
mutually desirable agreement with their husbands or dominant relatives. It is hard for them to
negotiate in difficult familial situations because they have few valued resources and the pressure
for them to submit is strongly institutionalized. Consequently, a woman’s refusal to comply with
any exchange rate set by her husband or in-laws often forces her to terminate the relationship.
While the power of a young wife is usually limited, there are cases where they can
successfully fulfill their wishes. Shahida explained that two years after she was married she gave
birth to her first child, a daughter. Afterwards, she said that her husband immediately began to
pressure her to have a second child because he wanted a son. Although her husband was against

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 6 #1 November 2004
https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol6/iss1/11

154
6

Nosaka and Andrews: Institutionalized Powerlessness in Context

waiting and did not want her to use contraceptives, she insisted, emphasizing the importance of
having an adequate amount of time between children. Shortly after their daughter was born she
was able to convince him and subsequently used contraceptives for three years before deciding to
try to get pregnant again.
It is important to emphasize here that although this example demonstrates a measure of
power for a young wife, issues concerning fertility control must be understood differently from
other types of behavior. Bangladeshi fertility has changed considerably over the last 30 years.
In 1970s, the country’s total fertility rate was 7, but it was reduced to 3.1 between 1995 and 2000
(Human Development Report 2000). This phenomenon is the result of strong government
support in favor of increasing the availability of modern contraceptives (see Larson and Mitra
1992; Nag 1992 for details). Today, most Bangladeshi people even in rural areas understand the
significance of contraceptives and young women of reproductive age are aggressively
encouraged to understand the importance of using them. Many rural women are fully aware of
the difficulties associated with supporting many children and sending them to school. They also
understand that proper birth spacing is vital for ensuring a mother’s good health. These concerns
have promoted widespread contraceptive use and conscious fertility control is now becoming an
important new cultural orientation.
Young women of reproductive age are likely to be more familiar with fertility control and
contraceptive use than their mothers-in-law because the introduction of these ideas is relatively
recent. Also, compared to men, they know more about these topics because they often talk about
them with one another and with government-hired female workers who regularly visit homes to
distribute and promote contraceptives. Women of reproductive age appear to be undeniably
influenced by these discussions. Many current and former contraceptive users said that they had
decided to use them because of recommendations by their neighbors and female relatives or
contraceptive distributors. It should be emphasized that their mothers-in-law and husbands may
still influence their reproductive behavior even though these women know more about fertility
regulation. Compared to traditional behavioral expectations, however, young wives are less
likely to be compliant about issues related to fertility.
Many young daughters-in-law often said that, "My mother-in-law does not say anything
about contraceptives," or "My mother-in-law and I do not (or did not) converse about the issue."
Some of the young interviewees also expressed the belief that their mothers-in-law would never
suggest that they stop using contraceptives. Mothers-in-law frequently demonstrated a neutral
attitude towards contraceptives taken to mean that they neither opposed nor encouraged their
daughters-in-law to use them. Even women who did not approve of fertility control were
generally reluctant to express it. Sufia actively directed her daughter-in-law’s household
activities but kept her negative opinion about contraception to herself. She claimed that, "It is
not my business to make decisions about young people's contraceptive use. This is up to my son
and daughter-in-law. My daughter-in-law seems to know much more than I do about
contraceptives, so I chose to say nothing." This example is important because it represents an
interaction between women of different generations that revolves around power resources based
on knowledge and experience associated with contraceptive use. In this area the tables are
turned and the superior knowledge the daughter-in-law has about contraception creates a
situation of passive compliance by the mother-in-law that goes against the traditional structure of
their relationship.
In contrast, husbands are likely to be more involved in the issues related to fertility
regulation. One young woman admitted that after she had her first child, she had received a
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contraceptive injection without her husband’s consent. When he found out about it, he was very
angry and forbid her from getting any further injections. Furthermore, this example turned tragic
when the child died and her husband placed the blame on the injection that she had received.
Fortunately, by the time she was interviewed she had three sons and was using pills according to
the approval and recommendation of her husband.
Like Shahida (mentioned above), some contraceptive users said that their husbands had
not initially agreed with their decision to them. In many cases, however, they were eventually
able to obtain the approval of their husbands by discussing the importance of fertility control.
Shahida even convinced her husband that they should have only two children so they could
provide them with adequate food and educational opportunities. She believed her natal home
environment was particularly difficult because she had grown up with two brothers and four
sisters. At the time of the interview, she was trying to get pregnant again but she expressed no
intention of trying once more for a son even if her second child turned out to be a daughter like
her first. When asked whether her husband agreed with her, she replied, “My husband would not
oppose."
These examples may indicate the establishment of a new pattern of relationships among
young wives and their family members according to an emerging emphasis on fertility control.
This appears to be true despite a continued adherence other traditional normative values.
Compared to most of their behavior, many young wives are relatively independent when it
comes to decisions about their fertility. It is possible that the relative independence a young wife
has in this particular realm from the influence of her mother-in-law will carry on into the future.
One quantitative study in rural Bangladesh has revealed a correlation between young married
women’s contraceptive use and a positive attitude their mothers-in-law have towards
contraception; this correlation was weakest in an area with an exceptionally high level of
contraceptive prevalence (Nosaka 1997, 1998). This suggests that the reproductive behavior of
young women may become more independent of their mothers-in-law as contraceptives continue
to become more widely available. It would seem that under these conditions mothers-in-law
would also gain knowledge and experience about fertility and contraception. According to
traditional Bangladeshi norms, this information would equip them with the ability to
aggressively direct the fertility behavior of their daughters-in-law. However, in most cases this
does not appear to be happening. Indeed, contraceptives have been prevalent in Matlab for more
than 30 years. Consequently, many mothers-in-law today may accept the independence of their
daughters-in-law concerning fertility control because that was the way it was with their mothersin-law a generation ago. If this pattern persists then it may become institutionalized.
The Transition to Middle Age
A woman begins to gain power in the family when she has her first child. Women who
had successfully borne children said that they felt as though they had established a relatively
secure position in the household. Child bearing not only immediately raises one’s self-esteem,
but it also represents a significant contribution that a woman can make to her household. This is
especially the case if she has had any sons. Furthermore, after several years of marriage a
woman is able to carry out many of the daily household chores without the incessant assistance
or supervision of her mother-in-law. By this time she has mastered the knowledge of proper
household management, and her mother-in-law's instructions are no longer needed unless a
special, traditional, or unfamiliar event takes place. Motherhood status and the accumulation of
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experience managing the household will gradually permit a woman to increase her level of
behavioral autonomy.
The independence attained by Shefali after six years of marriage is a good example.
When she had first moved into her husband’s household, her mother-in-law subjected her to
rigorous and explicit instructions on how to cook properly. At the time of the interview,
however, she explained that she made virtually all decisions about meal preparation although her
mother-in-law would still occasionally come to the kitchen and offer opinions or instructions.
Shefali also seemed to be confident and comfortable performing the other household activities as
she saw fit. Moreover, she admitted that she was free to excuse herself from the bari as long as
she remained in the village.
Although, most daughters-in-law regardless of age will usually ask their husbands or
parents-in-law for permission to leave the bari, as time goes on the pressure for them to be veiled
will decline, and they will become more mobile and active outside the bari. Furthermore,
compared to young wives, the behavior of experienced daughters-in-law is no longer strictly
suppressed, and they are more likely to voice their opinions. For example, one couple that had
been married for 14 years began living with the husband’s parents and two brothers when they
were first married. After seven years with this arrangement, the wife finally suggested that they
set up a separate household because it had become too crowded. By then she was raising four
small children and felt that it was necessary to make such a suggestion. Her husband concurred
and they immediately established an independent household.
Another telling example of a woman’s increasing power came to light during an
interview with Rohima, a young childless wife who had been married for only a year and a half.
Her senior sister-in-law, Akter, had insisted on sitting next to her when she was questioned.
Rohima was expectably very shy and quiet. In contrast, Akter was forward and confident and
had been married for more than 10 years and had four children. Many times during the interview
Akter would answer the questions before Rohima had a chance. Before clarifying the
relationship between the two, the first author thought that Akter was Rohima's mother-in-law
although she looked too young for this role. Their mother-in-law, however, had become very old
and had long since retired from many of the household activities. It appeared that Akter had
comfortably taken on the role of mother-in-law and acquired the power that went with it.
The Middle Age Mother-in-law
A woman normally enters middle age when she has grown or married children (Aziz
1985:85). In Bangladesh she may attain middle-age status as early as her late 30s because many
women marry so young. By this time, she has acquired considerable experience raising children
and managing a household; when her son marries she becomes "the active head of the domestic
realm" (Ellickson 1988:64). In addition, she is no longer bound by strict expectations to observe
purdah and this permits her with a greater range of mobility than a young woman and enables
her to influence the male dominated realm of financial decision making. The principal basis of
her power, however, rests on her dominance and supervision of the younger female members in
her household. By middle age, the relative freedom and domestic experience a woman has
attained provide her with a powerful, socially legitimated position from which she can expect the
compliance of her daughter-in-law. As we shall see, however, the conditions associated with the
institutionalized low status of women still require that she continue to work very hard.
One result of a middle-aged woman’s relative freedom from the restrictions of purdah is
an ability to move about outside the bari (Feldman and McCarthy 1983:952; Aziz 1985:85-87;
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Balk 1994:27). This freedom takes the form of more permissive social expectations that are
bolstered by the presence of a daughter-in-law under her command. Thus, she can leave the bari
knowing that there is another able bodied young woman who will do the household chores.
Nurjahan was a 39-year-old woman of five grown children -- four females and one male. When
her son married three years prior she eventually began visiting many relatives outside the bari
after she had taught her daughter-in-law to adequately manage the household activities. After
one of Nurjahan’s daughters gave birth she even stayed at her daughter's place for several days.
Nurjahan needed only obtain her husband's permission to enjoy this freedom.
Relative freedom from strict observance of purdah also permits a woman with more
liberty to express her opinions. Consequently, although male adult members make all the
ultimate financial decisions about the household economy, a middle-aged woman does have a
measure of influence in these affairs, particularly if it is her grown sons that are in charge. Many
middle age women said that they seldom offered their opinions to their husbands but they did
feel comfortable making suggestions to their sons. One woman explained that her grown son
had planned to buy a showcase to display their collection of knickknacks. She suggested that he
refrain because their household was struggling financially at the time. Although the ultimate
authority and power to make the decision was her son’s, he listened to her advice and decided he
would wait and perhaps buy the cabinet at a later date.
Despite greater mobility and a permissive level of participation in male decision-making,
a middle-aged woman is most involved in domestic female-based activities. The active and
instructive demeanor of a 48 year-old woman named Karuna aptly illustrates the typical daily life
of a middle-aged woman. She began her day before sunrise by washing and dirty dishes left from
the night before, sweeping the bari compound, taking a bath and then praying for 30 minutes.
Next, she began preparing breakfast by working alongside her two daughters-in-law ensuring
that things were being done properly. Around nine-thirty, she would eat breakfast and
immediately begin thinking about lunch because it often required more than two hours to prepare
even with her daughters-in-law assisting. Following lunch preparations Karuna would bathe
once again prior to eating. In the latter part of the day she usually rested until sunset when she
would then carry out the evening prayers. This routine culminated with another round of dinner
preparation and its consumption after which she usually went to sleep around nine o'clock.
This example illustrates that a middle age mother-in-law not only supervises her
daughter-in-law, but she also prefers to maintain a fairly active level of domestic activity herself.
On one hand, it is important for her to ensure the satisfactory performance of all the household
activities. For example, a daughter-in-law must have a meal ready by the time her husband
returns from work. During an interview with one young woman, her 55-year-old mother-in-law
became extremely irritated. She angrily exclaimed, "It is time for my son to be back here, but
nothing is ready because my daughter-in-law has been talking!!" Needless to say, this interview
was immediately terminated so the daughter-in-law could begin meal preparations. On the other
hand, particularly active mothers-in-law can substantially subsidize the duties of some young
women. One interviewee explained that she was rarely busy because her mother-in-law
continued to do most of the household chores (indeed, during this interview the young woman’s
mother-in-law was cooking). When her mother-in-law was asked about the accuracy of her
daughter-in-law’s response, she laughed aloud and simply said, "I like working."
The voluntary contribution of physical labor provided by a middle-age woman can be
understood as an institutionalized strategy that minimizes the decline in her power resources. If
her daughter-in-law takes complete charge of the household activities, then her contributions will
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be limited to verbal instructions. A middle-aged woman’s position in the household remains
strongest if she makes significant contributions of physical labor and directs the activities of her
younger family members. This permits the cumulative acquisition of additional respect and
approval from her household members. Consequently, it is instrumental in her ability to
maintain a more powerful position over her daughter-in-law who is gradually rising in status by
accumulating knowledge and experience. The respect and approval acquired by a middle age
woman via voluntary labor contributions represents the procurement of valuable resources that
she may need to rely on down the road. When she becomes primarily dependent on her family
members as her abilities decline, the potency of these intangible resources may to some degree
dampen the rapid deterioration in her familial position. In general, a woman has few tangible
resources (i.e. economic valuables and titles to the land or house) with which she can
compensate her family when her physical competency begins to fade. The institutionalized
investment a middle-aged woman makes in the accumulation of approval and respect for her
domestic abilities is often extremely important for her future.
The Old-Age Woman
The familial power and influence enjoyed by most rural Bangladeshi women only lasts
for a short time. When a woman reaches her middle to late 50’s she begins to relinquish her
traditional responsibilities (Aziz 1985:88). This transitional period is typically associated with a
woman’s gradual retirement from the role of the principal household manager, the death of her
husband, and a general decline in her physical or mental capabilities. It is during this time that
her daughter-in-law emerges as the prominent domestic figure and her son becomes the main
generator of family income while her aging husband, if he is still alive, gradually loses his
economic vitality. Thus, a woman becomes increasingly more marginalized as her younger
family members become economically and behaviorally independent.
The life of an old rural Bangladeshi woman is generally quiet and subdued. The daily
activities of a 61 year-old woman named Amena illustrate a typical case. She usually awoke
around 5 o'clock to pray and then fed the chickens and watered the plants. The rest of the day
she was free to do as she pleased because these morning activities were the only things she
habitually performed. Occasionally, Amena would weave mats and baskets, or do other chores
such as grinding spices and cutting vegetables. She would only help with the cooking when her
daughter-in-law was very busy. At the time of the interview, her daughter-in-law had been
married for seven years and knew how to manage the daily household activities. Although
Amena occasionally gave instructions to her daughter-in-law, in general her advice was only
requested during special occasions.
The death of a woman’s husband often has a drastic affect on her familial status. Recent
statistics on the Matlab area indicated that 56.4% of women aged 45 and above were widowed,
while only 5.9% of men of the same age were widowers (Rahman 1993:6). The onset of
widowhood is an event that usually marks the time when a woman’s son will become the head of
the household. Consequently, she formally relinquishes her position of spouse of the household
head to her daughter-in-law and essentially becomes her son’s economic dependent (Ellickson
1988:67; Rahman 1993:28). Although her husband's death may not immediately do away with
her power-base, it often substantially subdues her influence and credibility (Cain et al.
1979:423).
Widows are likely to be very passive. Majeda was a 61 years old woman who had been a
widow for 12 years when she was interviewed. Although she managed to leave the village for a

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 6 #1 November 2004
Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2004

159
11

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 11

week three or four times a year, she admitted that her physical health was in decline. On the one
hand, her son and daughter-in-law continued to interact with her on a relatively frequent basis.
Her daughter-in-law would request her permission to leave the bari and often asked what she
should prepare for a meal. Also, her son frequently asked for her advice about managing the
household economy. On the other hand, Majeda admitted that she rarely objected to their plans
or suggestions. She emphasized that since her husband died, she kept a low profile to ensure that
she maintained positive interactions with her younger family members. She seemed satisfied
with her status, and said that, "I am not physically strong, but I am happy with my life."
The loss of physical and mental capabilities can also further compromise an older
woman’s familial status (Maxwell 1986). A low level of physical competence limits behavioral
autonomy and makes one reliant on others for assistance (Collopy 1988). Frailty also inhibits a
woman’s ability to acquire new knowledge or to effectively use the knowledge she has to
instruct or influence others. A simultaneous decline in mental capabilities such as memory will
only exacerbate a woman’s loss of power further because it increases her dependency. Some
daughters-in-law explained that their mothers-in-law were so old or ill that they rarely consulted
with them about anything. Mariom, who had been married for 11 years, expressed an explicit
independence from her frail 71 year-old mother-in-law. She claimed that she made all daily
household decisions herself and seldom requested her husband’s opinion. Although Mariom
would ask her husband for permission to leave the bari, she never consulted with her mother-inlaw about this issue. In essence, a woman’s physical and mental capabilities are fundamental to
the preservation of her prominent household position because she has few if any economic assets
that can compensate for the loss of such resources (Cain 1991).
Eventually, the characteristics associated with the aging process leave most older women
essentially powerless and compliant. These results are often associated with increasingly lower
levels of familial interaction. Joleka was a 77 year-old widow who did not require physical
assistance from her two daughters-in-law living in her household but she moved slowly and
looked very old. Praying three times a day was her major activity: 10 or 15 minutes before
sunrise, 10 or 15 minutes between noon and one o'clock, and one hour during sunset. She also
occasionally cared for the children and fed the goats. Joleka looked forward to visits from her
three daughters, each of whom came to her bari every six months. But, overall her daily
interactions with other adult family members were few. At the time, her oldest daughter-in-law
who had been married for 14 years expressed open independence from Joleka because of her
confident capacity as the primary household manager. She said, "Today, I handle all work
without asking my mother-in-law's permission or advice. When want to leave the bari, I ask
permission from my husband; my mother-in-law will not object if it is alright with him."
It is typical for older rural women in Bangladesh to consciously acknowledge their
passive demeanor. For example, Fatema was a 60 year-old widowed woman who expressed a
comfortable indifference to any involvement in household decisions. At the time of the
interview, she explained that her household had multiple sources of income. Although her
youngest son was a student, her oldest one was a shopkeeper and her second oldest was
employed in a foreign country. Fatema said she no longer needed to participate in household
decisions because her sons had more experience with the modern world than she did. Many old
women like Fatema said that they accepted their quiet, dependent status and freely admitted that
they were too old to continue directing or influencing the behavior of their younger family
members.
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Although the foregoing is the normative pattern, the loss of an older woman’s power and
influence can be dampened if she has successfully garnered respect for her earlier domestic
efforts. Acknowledgement of substantial familial contributions can permit a woman to maintain
a relatively high level of respect despite becoming widowed and dependent. The younger family
members of these individuals may feel indebted and gain a sense of satisfaction by providing
them with obligatory respect and security. But this pattern also seems to be largely associated
with women fortunate enough to still have fairly sound physical capacities. At 62 years old,
Lalmati is a good example of a woman who appeared healthy and strong compared to other
women her age. She was also forthrightly proud of her physical condition. She explained that
although her daughter-in-law usually performed most of the household activities, she was more
than able to take over whenever her daughter-in-law was absent from the bari. Lalmati even
occasionally encouraged her daughter-in-law to visit her natal parents because she was quite
confident in her abilities. In addition, she would go on lengthy eight to ten day trips three or four
times a year to visit her relatives. Lalmati took these trips frequently because she was not solely
responsible for any household work. Since her husband had died the year before, she no longer
needed to ask anyone for permission to leave the bari. When she wanted to go on trip she just
informed her son and then left. In her mind, she had gained even power and autonomy as she
became older despite the death of her husband.
Begum illustrates another interesting example of an old woman with a relatively powerful
position who actually experienced a rise in her economic status as she became older. She was a
healthy looking 75 year-old widow whose son had already established a successful business
when her husband died 15 years ago. After her husband’s death, her son became the principal
household economic decision maker but Begum felt free to voice her opinions about anything if
she pleased. She was clearly proud of her earlier household contributions and emphasized that
they were the reason she had been able to raise successful sons. Begum also asserted that she
continued to have considerable power over economic decisions. For example, she often could
dissuade her son from purchasing something that was too expensive or unnecessary. She said,
"When I tell him something is not worth buying, he will not buy it."
Both Lalmati and Begum were widowed and de facto dependent on the economic support
of their sons. This condition could have placed them in passive and powerless positions;
however, they did not have to resort to compliance to the degree that other women with similar
conditions must do. They maintained relatively comfortable positions because they will still
physically functional and/or were acknowledged for their earlier exceptional contributions to the
household.
A position of power and influence based on physical capacity or respect for one’s
previous contributions is unlikely to maintain its potency forever (Maxwell 1986). Inevitably, a
woman’s physical and mental capabilities will decline making her increasingly more of a
dependent burden on her family. The typical passivity of most old women in rural Bangladesh
indicates such a dependence. Once again, exchange theory predicts that when the power
resources of two individuals are not balanced, the one with more sets the rate of exchange (Dowd
1975). The one with less power must accept this rate if he/she is dependent on the resources
gained by the interaction. Thus, an old Bangladeshi woman adopts a strategic institutionalized
demeanor of quiet compliance to maintain her security by minimizing possible interpersonal
friction. Consequently, her inert, reserved behavior also ultimately results in behavioral isolation
from her family members despite the fact that she lives with them. This burdensome quality of
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existence is a tragic reflection of the desperate socio-economic conditions prevalent throughout
rural Bangladesh.
Ironically, the misery associated with the lives of older women in rural Bangladesh may
be getting worse because of recent worldwide trends in medicine and health care. One result of
these trends has been the increase in Bangladeshi longevity. Life expectancy at birth was
estimated to be 44.9 years between 1970 and 1975, but was recently reported to be 58.1 years
between 1995 and 2000 (Human Development Report 2000). During this latter period, 63.1
percent of the people in Bangladesh were expected to live to at least to 60 years of age.
Although increases in longevity are rightfully regarded as progressive, given the quick tempo at
which rural Bangladeshi women still pass through their respective life stages, this phenomenon is
now expanding the length of time many of them must endure the institutionalized hardships of
old age status. In other words, they must experience a great amount of time in a powerless and
isolated state of being. Furthermore, their powerlessness and isolation may become even more
marked because the longer they live in an increasingly dependent capacity, the greater the stress
on their younger family members.
It is possible that the advances in medicine and health care will aid in prolonging not only
longevity but also one’s functional capacity on both a physical and mental level. This result
would act to temper the misery associated with prolonging old age life. Clearly, physically
strong women like Lalmati can remain relatively prominent because their functional capacity
permits them to continue contributing labor to the household. For most older rural Bangladeshi
women, however, the magnitude of any such changes will probably not be enough to offset the
harsh conditions pervasive in the society. Consequently, the current dynamic shaping the
institutionalized quality of female powerlessness in rural Bangladesh still appears to represent a
comparatively dismal situation. Although emergent fertility control in a woman’s early
reproductive years represents a new source of empowerment absent in the traditional normative
culture, it seems that they still may suffer later in life because of the prolonged period of
isolation and passivity typically associated with old age.
Summary and Conclusions
The status of most human beings changes according to the different social roles they have
during their lives. Degrees of change and the institutional structures framing this universal trait,
however, vary cross-culturally. The comparative nature of anthropology as a discipline allows
us to define this variation and understand it in terms of cultural context. The foregoing
discussion has examined the nature of traditional social institutions that undermine the status of
rural Bangladeshi women, and areas in which this cultural pattering now appears to be changing.
It has employed the perspective of exchange theory to understand how the overall low status of
these women shifts over the life course according to the social expectations surrounding
institutionalized family relationships.
Compared to many modern societies, the power and influence that a rural Bangladeshi
woman has available to her are relatively limited. When she is very young she is undervalued
because there is a preference for sons in the society (Arnold 1992; Bhuiya and Streatfield 1991;
Chen et al. 1981). As a young wife, she can acquire power although initially her behavior is
largely dependent on the wishes of other adult household members, especially the directives of
her mother-in-law. This dependency is the result of the limited resources she has relative to her
new family members, and because she must observe the strict rules associated with the
institution of purdah. A newly married woman is essentially marooned in an uncertain
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environment with no means of bargaining except absolute compliance; this is her only real power
resource. She must begin her ascent up the ladder of status via her role as a mother. Her status
comes from successfully bearing and raising children, and by gaining experience managing the
household. Indeed, the life of a barren wife in rural Bangladesh must be an absolutely dismal
existence, especially those who end up deferring to a second wife who is able to bear children.
By the time a woman enters middle age she has generally established a familial power
base founded on domestic accomplishments. She is also no longer bound by the behavioral
restrictions placed on a young wife. Early middle age represents, therefore, the period during
which a woman enjoys her greatest measure of influence enabling her to interact with younger
family members in a more aggressive and direct manner. During this life stage, a few women
are also able to accumulate power resources that will cushion the decline in their status usually
associated with the onset of old age. Typically, such power comes from respect and recognition
that their younger family members have for their earlier contributions to the current household
level of social and economic prosperity.
When a middle-age woman becomes older her power base will begin to diminish relative
to the resources held by her younger family members. This is usually inversely proportional to
the power resources her daughter-in-law gains from experience in the domestic sphere. When an
older woman’s husband dies, she loses her status as wife of the household head to her daughterin-law and becomes economically dependent on her son. Such events also tend to coincide with
a progressive loss of her physical strength and/or mental capacity, in addition to declining selfesteem. As a consequence, an aging woman is usually invisible and behaves passively when
interacting with her family. Thus, a rural Bangladeshi woman has few if any real options for
acquiring the limited power resources that are available to her. Her campaign must play out
within the family; she is essentially restricted to a domestic mode of empowerment where her
advancements are achieved and ephemeral.
Much of the foregoing discussion indicates that the traditional institutions defining the
lives of rural Bangladeshi women appear to be relatively unchanging.4 The authors have stressed,
however, some social phenomena that were not prevalent as recently as 20 years ago. The issue
of a young woman’s control over her fertility is one example. Fertility control was not a factor
before the idea of fertility regulation was introduced and modern contraceptives became widely
available. Female fertility, therefore, was neither an issue of whether or when a woman would
have a child, nor a question of who would make these decisions. In contrast, today many people
accept the idea of fertility regulation and contraceptive use. What is interesting is that fertility
decisions appear to fall largely in the hands of a young wife. This is a departure from the
traditional pattern where a woman’s mother-in-law and/or husband had control over virtually all
of her behavior. It indicates a dynamic social component at work in the society where, at least
with respect to fertility, a young woman now has some measure of decision making power that
her older female family members did not enjoy when they were young. To some degree, fertility
control appears to be altering the traditional institutional pattern of intra-family relationships.
Another recent change discussed in this study is the increase in overall longevity in
Bangladesh that is prolonging the length of time old rural women must endure the
powerlessness, passivity, and isolation associated with old age. The longer most older women
live, the less they will be able to physically contribute to the household and the more
burdensome they will become to their younger family members. This threatens to increase the
level of stress already experienced by poor families in the rural countryside. Such a development
will probably not bring about significant changes in the traditional family institutions defining a
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woman’s status in old age but it does directly affect the long-term quality of her life.
Furthermore, we wish to stress that life is hard for rural Bangladeshi people, especially the
poorest families with members who are old and incapacitated. If it gets significantly harder, then
some form of social change will be inevitable; it may create a demand for state institutions that
can help care for the older population, a role that is traditionally carried out by the extended
family.
Future research is needed to see how fertility control and the increase in longevity will
affect social changes in the lives of rural Bangladeshi women. Decisions about fertility control
may remain in the hands of young women as it is in many other parts of the world. It is also
possible, however, that within a generation fertility decisions may be taken over by mothers-inlaw who are currently contraceptive users. They may use their experience to control or influence
the fertility regulation of their future daughters-in-law. The increase in longevity may result in
pressure on the state to provide more support for a growing old age population, the majority of
which will probably be women. Knowing how such developments influence the familial
interactions and roles of these Bangladeshi women will enhance our comprehensive
understanding of how traditional societies are changing in the face of the modern world.
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Although this discussion uses the words “traditional” and “modern,” the exaggerated stereotypes sometimes
associated with this dichotomy are not intended (see Djao, 2002). To the contrary, it demonstrates the social
heterogeneity of people that maintain, or live according to, traditions specific to their culture, but also they have
come under the influence of some Western concepts and technologies. These western influences are not necessarily
viewed as advantageous. Moreover, there is no intent to suggest that “traditional” women are “ignorant,”
“uneducated,” or “victimized” as opposed to their western, “modern” counterparts that have been characterized as
“sophisticated,” “educated,” or “controlling” (see Mohanty, 1991b). The purpose of this study is to focus on both
the static and dynamic nature of women’s lives in a specific socio-cultural and historic context (see Mohanty,
1991a).
3

Fieldwork by the primary author focused on contraceptive behavior and the familial relationships, particularly
between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. Given this emphasis, the primary author did not target the collection
of first-hand information on micro-finance institutions and their influence on the power struggle between men and
women. The authors do not maintain that familial interactions among women play out independent of the culturally
based concerns, expectations, and mandates of male family members. Consequently, male behavior relevant to the
main topic of this article is discussed in the text where appropriate.
4

Not emphasized in this article, besides changes brought about by recent fertility behavior (e.g., contraception) and
increased longevity, the involvement of rural women in micro-finance programs is also a factor affecting change in
the traditional social fabric. These programs lend minimal amounts of capital at low rates of repayment that are
typically used to begin and maintain small-scale economic enterprises. On one hand, generating income and making
economic decisions have been strictly male “business” in Bangladesh. Consequently, many men stubbornly resist
cash-generating activities associated with household decision-making on the part of women. Indeed, a study by
Goetz and Gupta (1996) suggests that more than 60 percent of female borrowers do not significantly control the
transactions associated with their loans; in these cases, control falls predominantly in the hands of husbands or other
male family members. Also, young married women closely supervised by aggressive mothers-in-law probably have
the least control, whereas their older married counterparts have greatest control (Goetz and Gupta 1996). In
addition, women who do have substantial command over their assets usually invest in activities such as livestock
and poultry rearing in and around the bari; traditionally, these activities have been ascribed to women (Goetz and
Gupta 1996; Hashemi et al. 1996). Hence, even though micro-finance programs have allowed women to enter the
male-dominated cash economy, for many, true monetary control is still largely structured according to traditional
norms, specifically the gender division of labor, purdah, and intra-family relationships. On the other hand, numerous
women have successfully established themselves through such programs. Even though control by some women
over their loans and investment activities is limited and their contributions remain undervalued, those who
participate generally have more economic and decision making power in the household and are more conscious
about political matters and active in public events (Hashemi et al. 1996). One study even suggests that these
programs have increased contraceptive use because they often reinforce many of the values promoted by family

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 6 #1 November 2004
Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2004

167
19

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 11

planning programs (Schuler et al. 1997). Further investigation is required to examine how significantly microfinance programs have affected relatively low status young wives and old widows, and how such programs will
continue to promote a broad movement of female empowerment. Nevertheless, similar to family planning, microfinance has provided women with opportunities that were not available a few decades ago.
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